Introduction
According to scholars of International Relations (IR), Hobbes has long been the archetypical realist. This view usually relies on two quote from Leviathan, both from the 13 th Chapter of Book I: First, the idea that life in the state of nature is 'nasty, brutish, and short', i.e. without some authority structure individuals will simply pursue their interests with no regard for rules of laws (Hobbes 1968 (Hobbes [1651 , pp. 186); second, the infamous sentence, also from Leviathan, in which Hobbes claims that sovereign political communities are no more than 'gladiators' pointing their weapons at each other (Hobbes 1968 (Hobbes [1651 .
Realists see here a Hobbes who reinforces their view that the international order is an anarchic one with no place for institutions and laws.
As with any author, a simplistic reading is often based on the interpretative assumptions brought to the text, a failure to read more widely than a single quote, or a disciplinary background that selectively explores a few themes rather than a wider argument.
All of these background conditions can be found in the IR reading of Hobbes. The fault is not only with realists, however, but with critics of realism as well.1 Certainly, there are dimensions of Hobbes' thought that lend themselves to such a reading. Hobbes did indeed see political life as a constant struggle to ensure peace by creating a powerful sovereign.
In this article, I suggest an alternative reading of Hobbes, one that finds in his work a defence of both international law and global constitutionalism. This reading relies on interpretations of Hobbes from David Dyzenhaus, Larry May and Richard Flathman.
Dyzenhaus has argued in a number of places that Hobbes should be read as a theorist of constitutionalism because of the strong emphasis on the rule of law in his framework. May's reading of Hobbes theory of constitutional contract and equity point to how he can be read as defender of an international legal and institutional order. Flathman argues for a Hobbes whose focus on the individual results in a powerful foundation for an alternative international order. From each one of these theorists (supplemented by a few others), I develop an account of Hobbes as a theorist of global constitutionalism, one whose insights into the intersection of law and politics in any political order points to a new way of seeing the global constitutional order.
International law relies on the interests of states (Koskenniemi 2005) . The origins of this tradition can be found in numerous places, from the raison d'etat of Machiavelli to the idealism of Hegel. This statism parallels the statism of realism, making both subject to a failure to take into account the individual person's role in international and global affairs. Of course, practically, the global level prevents us from seeing and conceptualizing the individual, much less finding any political agency for individuals. Alternatives to this statist international legal order have emerged in recent years. The first can be found in the effort to re-envision international law and politics through cosmopolitanism. This approach focuses on the individual as the primary point of consideration in the construction of alternative political orders at the global level. Cosmopolitanism can be found across a range of different philosophical and political theorists. Perhaps the most influential in those seeking to locate a cosmopolitan orientation through international law can be found in the figure of Immanuel Kant (Brown 2009 , Habermas 2006 . There is a strong individualist orientation in cosmopolitanism. And, as with Hobbes, Kant is often located in a particular tradition of thought within IR, one that is alternatively labelled idealist, utopian or liberal. Indeed, one critique of this literature is that it fails to locate cosmopolitan potential in actual international legal and political practices.2
The second comes through the literature on global constitutionalism. Global constitutionalism argues that there exist emerging patterns and practices in international law and politics that can be read as instances of constitutionalism, broadly defined. These new practices and patterns can be found in a renewed emphasis on the rule of law; the creation of new judicial institutions; calls for the separation of powers in international institutional frameworks; and the role of protest and revolutionary actions by non-state actors in response to the powers of states and international organizations. Global constitutionalism finds space for the individual in the global order in ways that traditional international fails to do. It is a normative framework for re-envisioning international law and politics.
Hobbes provides resources for thinking about an individualist global order that does not fall victim to the utopianism of much of cosmopolitan thinking but can be located in a constitutional framing. To make this Hobbesian alternative more concrete, I propose here a chastened global constitutionalism, borrowing the idea of chastened individualism from Flathman's reading of Hobbes. Hobbes is not normally considered a theorist of constitutionalism; his aversion to dividing sovereignty makes ideas such as separation and balance of powers less amenable to a Hobbesian account. But his writing on law (Dyzenhaus and Poole 2012) make him a useful theorist of a political order that is essentially legal. And, his focus on peace, a focus often ignored by realist interpreters, makes him directly relevant for conceptualizing both international and global constitutionalism. The combination of his legalism and liberalism make Hobbes a surprisingly important and useful theorist for articulating one version of global constitutionalism.
The article proceeds as follows: The first section provides a reading of Hobbes' key arguments that highlights the importance of law and individualism, drawing on the work of 
Authority and Law
Let me start by saying something about Hobbes ideas concerning authority, for his theoretical apparatus is, I would argue, largely about the way in which we can justify an authority structure.3 As is well known, in Leviathan (1651) Hobbes sought to develop an argument that would explain why individuals should abdicate their rights to a powerful sovereign. Hobbes argued that without the Leviathan society could not function. Not only would social and political norms be overridden, normal social intercourse and even language would not be possible. While he emphasized the sovereign's absolute authority, it is important to remember that Hobbes' ideas of governance and authority are grounded in a liberal conception of the human person, that is, one that relies upon the rights of individual persons (Strauss 1936) . The nature of the human person, however, produces the need for a sovereign to whom those rights will be abdicated. Those individuals pursue power in order to protect themselves since they have an equal ability to kill each other (Hobbes 1968 (Hobbes [1651 . This description of the human person leads Hobbes to propose a series of natural laws, the first two of which are the most important: First, every man seeks peace. Second, every man will defend himself (Hobbes 1968 (Hobbes [1651 . The result of these natural laws is that man must submit to a sovereign authority that will ensure the protection of all.
That sovereign has authority over all members of the society, the result of a contract of sorts among individuals in a society. That contractual relationship leads members to create an authority to which they owe their allegiance. That authority manifests itself in the ability of the sovereign to issue commands. Commands are orders expressive of the will of the sovereign and are authoritative for this reason. Laws derive their force from being commands of the sovereign which Hobbes differentiates from counsels, which are orders to obey based on reasons for what would be good for the individual (Hobbes 1968 (Hobbes [1651 .4 This distinction is central to Hobbes' conception of obligation. I am obliged to follow the dictates of the sovereign not because he gives me reasons to do so, but simply because he has ordered me to do so. If the sovereign is forced to justify his orders and debate with individuals, then his authority is weakened. This obligation to obey the sovereign is, ultimately, grounded in Hobbes' natural law arguments -obedience is necessary to protect us from each other, a point that arises from Hobbes' natural laws, particularly the first two. But, once we have entered into the contract with the sovereign, we no longer need to have our obedience justified by reference to those reasons but simply because the sovereign wishes it to be that way.5
Authority is not a simple matter for Hobbes, for it must both make sense of why individuals should obey and also how to make authority concrete. Law is the means by which both tasks are accomplished. That is, a law governed order is one that prevents an authority figure from governing without any limits or whimsically, hence respecting the agency of the individual as in need of some order, and it also makes specific the ways in which commands come about. Hobbes defines law as: 'A Law is the Command of him, or them that have the Soveraign Power, given to those that be his or their Subjects, declaring Publickly, and plainly what every of them may do, and what they must forbear to do' (Hobbes 1971 (Hobbes [1681 : 71).
So, while the realist picture of Hobbes described in the opening pages of this article would imply that nothing can limit the sovereign power, law, while not a limit on authority, is fundamental for making authority work.
While law makes authority function, Hobbes does not see a benefit in limiting that authority. To do so is to allow the possibility of division and ultimately war. As he states clearly in one of his earlier works, Elements of the Law: 'The division of sovereignty, either worketh no effect, to the taking away of simple subjection, or introduceth war; wherein the private sword hath place again' (Hobbes 2008 (Hobbes [1640 : 116). The passages that follow, though, do leave space for a pragmatic division of labour in governing, noting that there is space for monarchy, aristocracy and democracy in the practice of government (ibid). This division is not designed to limit the sovereign but to make it possible for the sovereign to govern in order that a political order can work effectively to accomplish that most important of aims: the creation of peace. 6
Hobbes' understanding of law, then, is directly related to his understanding of authority and sovereignty. He defines law by means of sovereignty, as in Leviathan, Chapter (Hobbes 1968 (Hobbes [1651 : 312). As he goes on to explain the Commonwealth is nothing but the Representative, which is the Sovereign. This view of law stands in contrast to two alternatives. First, the natural law tradition posits that law derives from the application of right reason to the human condition. Hobbes begins his reflections on law through an engagement with the idea of natural law. In Leviathan, Chapters 13 and 14 elaborate the human condition and the resulting natural laws. And, in Chapter 26 in which he explains the civil law, Hobbes states that 'The Law of Nature, and the Civil Law, contain each other, and are of equall extent' (Hobbes 1968 (Hobbes [1651 : 314). Martin Loughlin argues that because Hobbes saw himself as providing a justification for authority and law, he needed to address natural law in some way. Rather than re-establishing natural law in its traditional form as the basis for civil law, Loughlin suggests that 'Hobbes made natural law a central focus of his work… in order to expose its errors and rework its precepts for the purpose of rebuilding the authority of sovereign will' (Loughlin 2012: 12) .
The second alternative to Hobbes' account is that of the common law. In both Leviathan, Chapter 26 and in the Dialogue, Hobbes argues that the history of a custom or the wisdom of judges cannot be the basis for law or our obligation to obey it. Against those who would argue that the ancient heritage of law is what gives it validity, Hobbes states: 'When long Use obtaineth the authority of a Law, it is no the Length of Time that maketh the Authority, but the Will of the Soveraign signified by his silence, (for Silence is sometimes an argument of Consent;) and it is no longer Law, then the Soveraign shall be silent therein' (Hobbes 1968 (Hobbes [1651 : 313). And, further, in response to Edward Coke's defense of the role of the long study and wisdom of the common lawyer:
For it is possible long study may encrease, and conform erroneous Sentences; and where men build on false grounds, the more they build, the greater is the ruine; and of those that study, and observe with equall time, and diligence, the reasons and resolutions are, and must remain discordant: and there it is not that Juris prudientia, or wisdom of subordinate Judges; but the Reason of this our Artificall Man the Common-wealth, and his Command that maketh the Law: And the Common-wealth being in their Representative but one Person, there cannot easily arise any contradiction in the Lawes; and when there doth, the same Reason is able, by interpretation, or alteration, to take it away. Hobbes 1968 Hobbes [1651 |: 317
Neither history nor wisdom can give the common law the authority that it deserves, but only the sovereign legislator can give it that authority.
Reflecting on the authority of law leads one to the question of constitutionalism. For some, Hobbes is a constitutional theorist, for he gives a strong defense of the rule of law.
David Dyzenhaus, for instance, argues that Hobbes' constitutional theory is 'a theory of fundamental principles of legality which does not fit neatly into our contemporary categories of legal positivism and natural law. Indeed, it seems to me that we can make better sense of Hobbes as an early theorist of the rule of law tradition, whose members hold that the ultimate constitution of political order is legal and not political' (Dyzenhaus 2010: 456) . Those who see constitutional as about a separation and balance of powers would not see Hobbes as a theorist within this tradition, but Dyzenhaus and others who privilege the rule of law as the primary criterion of a constitutional order can find in Hobbes resources to defend their position.
Dyzenhaus argues that Hobbes also provides a resource for defending an international rule of law. Unlike the majority of interpretations of Hobbes on international affairs, Dyzenhaus focuses on the centrality of law in Hobbes account of all political life, domestic and international. He points to the fact that the existence of the sovereign results not from an aggrandizement of power by any individual but that it results from a fundamentally legal project: 'Submission to a sovereign is not submission to the arbitrary rule of one person. It is submission to the rule of one artificial person whose identity is legally constituted and who not only rules through law but in accordance with the rule of law. Submission to sovereignty is ultimately submission to the rule of law' (Dyzenhaus 2014: 55) . While not suggesting that the international community of states has created a sovereign leviathan by which they can be governed, Dyzenhaus does propose that the international laws made by states bind them in some fundamental way. They are bound because by accepting their status as states, they have accepted the fact that they must act in accordance with and justify their arguments in terms of international laws. The act of making is not an act of making the sovereign that the domestic community has undertaken but the act of creating a body of laws that define the nature of the international order.
Hobbes' understanding of law relies on his understanding of sovereign authority. The sovereign, the artificial person created by the community, serves as the legislator, executive and judiciary. That sovereign must retain all these roles in one to prevent the anarchy and war that would result from individuals pursuing their own interests. And, while Hobbes admits that the international realm looks closest to this anarchy, he does not necessarily see international law or order absent at the global level.
International Constitutionalism
Dyzenhaus presents a Hobbes who privileges the rule of law, hence making him a theorist of constitutionalism. Dyzenhaus makes the further argument that this emphasis on law in Hobbes account is relevant not only at the domestic but at the international level as well. This element of constitutionalism is, of course, one part of the ideology of constitutionalism. Constitutionalism is the political philosophy that proposes political life should be law governed and that no one actor should be able to dominate a political order. A constitution is a purposefully constructed political and legal text that sets out the details of such a system is to be ordered. Not all constitutional political orders have a written constitution and not all constitutions embody the norms of constitutionalism. Fuller's quasi-natural law theory (May 2013: 137-138 ).
These two elements of May's argument, the idea of a constitutional contract and the idea of equity, come together in his reflections on Hobbes and international law and institutions. May's book concludes with a defence of Hobbes as a theorist of international law and institutions against the views of those realists who only quote the famous sentence from
Chapter 13 in which states are nothing more than gladiators facing off with each. May argues that even this passage allows space for an association of states that might seek to provide for the welfare of their peoples (May 2013: 182-183 developed an account of authority, rights and liberalism that privileges a strong individualism. His early work drew upon analytic political philosophy to flesh out key concepts in liberal theory, primarily rights and authority (Flathman 1977 (Flathman , 1980 . From these and other works, he has constructed an account of what he calls 'wilful liberalism', a liberalism based on a strong individualism that verges on the anarchic but shies away from embracing this position fully (Flathman 1989 (Flathman , 1992 (Flathman , 1998 to all effective thought and action and indeed as the dominant party in the perpetually unstable array of forces responsible for both peace and disorder, both great achievements and horrific failures' (Flathman 2002: 20) . Language, reason and science bring these modes of thought and action under some semblance of control, or at least allow us to interact with and understand each to some extent. Hobbes believed his theories could give some order to this scientific endeavour, for he argued against those who would distort our ability to clarify the meaning and scope of scientific inquiry. At the same time, Flathman argues that within Hobbes' efforts there remained a deep scepticism about our ability to understand each other even when using the same words and language. This scepticism and lack of understanding is not necessarily resolved by giving the Leviathan the ability to define and control meanings, though this certainly ameliorates it to some extent.
Based on this reading of Hobbes' natural science, Flathman turns to their relevance for political life. Reminding us of Hobbes first two natural laws (Hobbes 1968 (Hobbes [1651 ), Flathman contends that there are two modes of self-making possible in Hobbes' account. The more well-known is the creation of the Leviathan, a governmental authority that allows for the creation of peace by preventing self-interested persons from harming each other. But he highlights the other, individualistic form of self-making that Hobbes proposes.
Persons must seek to cultivate in themselves certain virtues, ways of being that will allow them to live with each other commodiously. For most, this means prudence, a form of moderation that prevents us from overreaching and harming each other. But for some, there is also the cultivation of attributes such as magnanimity, gallantry, and generosity. These forms of self-making get less attention in commentaries on Hobbes, but Flathman argues that are crucial to undermining the view that Hobbes is a pessimist about human nature. Rather than seeing individual humans as evil or bad in their pursuit of their interests, Hobbes wants them to cultivate forms of the self that will allow them to pursue their interests but in a way that recognizes the reality of a human condition of scarcity and equality of ability to harm others.
The Leviathan, then, is not the only answer to the problem of the human condition, though it is an essential one when individuals to not engage in the forms of self-making that Hobbes sees as a way to retain our strong individuality and live with others.
Flathman thus finds in Hobbes resources for a strong individualism. Hobbes, he concludes, feared democratic governance because it in this form of political life that there is the most threat to individualism and liberty. While the monarch may be flawed and thus construct a flawed political order, an active and animated demos will encourage the 'vainglorious' who will seek to appear before all others as most important and hence try to outdo each other with activity. 8 For Hobbes, and Flathman, this tendency in democratic life is to be feared more than the possibility of a single unconstrained sovereign, whose political reach is limited. Rather than turn toward a democratic structure that feeds the competitive spirit in public life, Flathman highlights those elements of Hobbes in which education is central. Civic education is where forms of character building can take place that might lead to the attributes identified as creating more possibilities for peace (Flathman 2002: 154; see also Slomp 2000: 173 (Bain 2014: 27) . The individualism of Flathman is not directly invoked here, but a parallel account can be found in his defence of the singularity of existence, one that can only be tamed by God in the natural world and the human person in the political world.
In both Bain and Williams we see how some of the themes that Flathman has developed in his reading might be applicable at the global level. From all three, we find a theorist of artifice and making, a theorist who suggests that only when we take control of our lives and provide the order we need can there be peace. This wilful liberalism, strong individualism, and sceptical theory of limits leads can lead us to law and institution making.
Just as in domestic political life we make the Leviathan to constrain and control us, so in global political life we can make and construct similar institutional structures.
To bring this discussion back to global constitutionalism, one might consider different elements of self-making at the global level that can fruitfully draw on Flathman's reading of Hobbes. The creative and imaginative dimension that Flathman draws from Hobbes might be helpful in thinking about imaginative alternatives to the current international order. For instance, the recent argument of James Tully that on global citizenships provides one possibility. Tully has long been a creative and insightful interpreter of John Locke, who, along with Hobbes, helped shape our understanding of rights in a liberal order (Tully 1993 ).
But he critically reads Locke and the entire tradition of Western constitutional theory, as failing to account for alternative communal formulations, ones that do not allow for a plurality of voices at the global level (Tully 1995 Finally, it is important to remember the 'chastened' dimension of Hobbes' ideas about law and politics. Hobbes is not Kant, as he does not envision a progressive enlightenment of the human condition such that it will recognize the importance of law and justice at the domestic than global levels. Rather, Hobbes recognizes the dangers of the human condition, though he should not be read as a simple theorist of a sinful human nature causing these problems. Instead, Hobbes believes we can continually make and remake our institutions to achieve the peace and concord necessary for our shared life to continue. Williams helpfully reminds us that there are strands in realist thought that are not simplistic dismissals of the possibility of cooperation and peace, but that we can have a chastened perspective on global political life. This means not believing that each and every new institution or legal development will create universal peace and justice. It means, instead, being aware of the problems of political life but not abandoning the possibility of making and remaking our political lives at the domestic and global levels.
Conclusion
This article began with the idea that Thomas Hobbes might be more helpful in understanding global constitutionalism than he is normally seen to be. Rather than a pessimistic theorist of a flawed human condition, the reading I have undertaken here presents is an essential part of the law making process. 5-Of course, Howard Warrender argued for a different foundation for obligation in Hobbes, one based on divinely based natural law (Warrender 1957) . Obligation is more complex than I am presenting it here, of course; one might also argue that once the sovereign fails in his obligation to provide peace, the members of society are no longer obligated to obey him. The basis of obligation in Hobbes is not my central concern here, though, so I will not explore this in any depth. 6-Tom Sorell's contribution to this special edition makes a strong case for an undivided sovereign as the central message of Hobbes' thinking on law and politics. Patricia Springborg, in her reading of the Elements, also makes such an argument. 
